火炬/火炬系统/高架火炬/密闭火炬 (Flare System)火炬/火炬系统/高架火炬/密闭火炬 (Flare System)
⚠ ⚠ Top risk: 湿硫化氢损伤 · RPN 72 (Critical) — watch this one first at the equipment
Risk Board (all 15 · by RPN · top 6 highlighted urgent)
Shield: Safety = people/environment Production = production only
Technical mechanism/mitigation body in Chinese (red line: no fabricated MT; EN UI labels translated)
15Failure Modes
14High/Critical
6Standards
2Real Accidents
Tap any failure mode to flip to its on-site guidance
Device-level standard/accident index (6 standards / 2 accidents)
Standards (6 de-duplicated)
API 521API 537API 580 — Risk-Based InspectionISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipmentGB/T 50160API RP 571
Accident Lessons (2 de-duplicated)
CSB-BPHUSKY-TOLEDO-2022CSB2022 ↗CSB BP-Husky Toledo 炼厂 2022 石脑油溢流至燃料气系统闪火(2 死,2024 终报) CSB-BPTEXASCITY-2005CSB2005 ↗CSB BP Texas City 2005 异构化装置放空罐/放空烟囱直排大气导致 15 死爆炸
FM Traceability Cards (15)
高温硫化氢/氢腐蚀RPN 72 · Critical
Failure Mechanism
高温硫化氢/氢腐蚀 驱动材料退化/功能失效
How to Detect
Online monitoring · Detection rate 80% ;Re-inspect ≤every24months
Mitigation (What to Do)
RCM Strategy
CBMOn-Condition Maintenance
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (6)
API 521API 537API 580 — Risk-Based InspectionISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipmentGB/T 50160API RP 571
Lessons Learned (2)
CSB-BPHUSKY-TOLEDO-2022CSB2022Fatalities 2 · Fire/ExplosionCSB BP-Husky Toledo 炼厂 2022 石脑油溢流至燃料气系统闪火(2 死,2024 终报)Root cause: PHA 虽识别溢流风险但 SIS/紧急泄压阀等独立保护层未能阻止液体溢流进入燃料气系统;异常工况管理(报警洪泛 3712 条/12h)失效;未有效运用停工程序Official source ↗ CSB-BPTEXASCITY-2005CSB2005Fatalities 15 · Injuries 180 · Explosion/FireCSB BP Texas City 2005 异构化装置放空罐/放空烟囱直排大气导致 15 死爆炸Root cause: 放空系统过时且不安全——放空烟囱未连接至安全火炬系统;BP 2002 年曾考虑连接但放弃;PHAs 未充分识别该风险Official source ↗
均匀/局部减薄(通用减薄)RPN 54 · High
Failure Mechanism
均匀/局部减薄(通用减薄) 驱动材料退化/功能失效
How to Detect
Online monitoring · Detection rate 80% ;Interval by RBI
Mitigation (What to Do)
RCM Strategy
CBMOn-Condition Maintenance
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (6)
API 521API 537API 580 — Risk-Based InspectionISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipmentGB/T 50160API RP 571
Lessons Learned (2)
CSB-BPHUSKY-TOLEDO-2022CSB2022Fatalities 2 · Fire/ExplosionCSB BP-Husky Toledo 炼厂 2022 石脑油溢流至燃料气系统闪火(2 死,2024 终报)Root cause: PHA 虽识别溢流风险但 SIS/紧急泄压阀等独立保护层未能阻止液体溢流进入燃料气系统;异常工况管理(报警洪泛 3712 条/12h)失效;未有效运用停工程序Official source ↗ CSB-BPTEXASCITY-2005CSB2005Fatalities 15 · Injuries 180 · Explosion/FireCSB BP Texas City 2005 异构化装置放空罐/放空烟囱直排大气导致 15 死爆炸Root cause: 放空系统过时且不安全——放空烟囱未连接至安全火炬系统;BP 2002 年曾考虑连接但放弃;PHAs 未充分识别该风险Official source ↗