Tap any failure mode → flip to its on-site guidance (pure-CSS, no JS needed on mobile)
疏水阀/疏水器/蒸汽疏水阀 (Steam Trap)疏水阀/疏水器/蒸汽疏水阀 (Steam Trap)
⚠ ⚠ Top risk: 机械疲劳 · RPN 72 (Critical) — watch this one first at the equipment
Risk Board (all 9 · by RPN · top 6 highlighted urgent)
Shield: Safety = people/environment Production = production only
Technical mechanism/mitigation body in Chinese (red line: no fabricated MT; EN UI labels translated)
9Failure Modes
8High/Critical
6Standards
4Real Accidents
Tap any failure mode to flip to its on-site guidance
Device-level standard/accident index (6 standards / 4 accidents)
Standards (6 de-duplicated)
  • GB/T 22654
  • GB/T 12250
  • ASME B31.1
  • API 580 — Risk-Based Inspection
  • ISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment
  • API RP 571
Accident Lessons (4 de-duplicated)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010
Macondo / Deepwater Horizon Blowout
2021-05-I-TXcsb2021
LyondellBasell La Porte 控制阀误拆甲醇释放(拉波特)
2021-07-I-TXcsb2021
LyondellBasell La Porte 醋酸装置柱塞阀压力保持件误拆致命泄漏
NUREG-LER-2012-001NUREG2012
Shearon Harris 1 号机 主蒸汽隔离阀活塞环腐蚀致关闭延迟
FM Traceability Cards (9)
Generated by Reliability AI
机械疲劳RPN 72 · Critical
Failure Mechanism
机械疲劳 驱动材料退化/功能失效
How to Detect
Online monitoring · Detection rate 70% ;Re-inspect ≤every24months
Mitigation (What to Do)
  • 磁粉/超声波检测
  • 应力分析复核
  • Periodic nondestructive testing
RCM Strategy
CBMOn-Condition Maintenance
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (6)
  • GB/T 22654
  • GB/T 12250
  • ASME B31.1
  • API 580 — Risk-Based Inspection
  • ISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment
  • API RP 571
Lessons Learned (3)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010Fatalities 11 · Injuries 17 · Safety/Environmental
Macondo / Deepwater Horizon Blowout
Root cause: Blowout-preventer valve sticking + cement plug failure + missing well-integrity verification.
Official source ↗
2021-05-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 30 · Safety/Environmental
LyondellBasell La Porte 控制阀误拆甲醇释放(拉波特)
Root cause: 阀门维护中承压部件被误拆,隔离与作业程序不足导致甲醇大量释放;2 死 30 伤
Official source ↗
2021-07-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 2 · Toxic/Safety
LyondellBasell La Porte 醋酸装置柱塞阀压力保持件误拆致命泄漏
Root cause: 阀门设计未防人误拆(同类事故重复发生);无拆卸程序与培训;承包商与公司均未识别风险
Official source ↗
脆性断裂RPN 72 · Critical
Failure Mechanism
脆性断裂 驱动材料退化/功能失效
How to Detect
Online monitoring · Detection rate 70% ;Re-inspect ≤every24months
Mitigation (What to Do)
  • 磁粉/超声波检测
  • 应力分析复核
  • Periodic nondestructive testing
RCM Strategy
RTFDesign Modification / Inspection Task
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (6)
  • GB/T 22654
  • GB/T 12250
  • ASME B31.1
  • API 580 — Risk-Based Inspection
  • ISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment
  • API RP 571
Lessons Learned (3)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010Fatalities 11 · Injuries 17 · Safety/Environmental
Macondo / Deepwater Horizon Blowout
Root cause: Blowout-preventer valve sticking + cement plug failure + missing well-integrity verification.
Official source ↗
2021-05-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 30 · Safety/Environmental
LyondellBasell La Porte 控制阀误拆甲醇释放(拉波特)
Root cause: 阀门维护中承压部件被误拆,隔离与作业程序不足导致甲醇大量释放;2 死 30 伤
Official source ↗
2021-07-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 2 · Toxic/Safety
LyondellBasell La Porte 醋酸装置柱塞阀压力保持件误拆致命泄漏
Root cause: 阀门设计未防人误拆(同类事故重复发生);无拆卸程序与培训;承包商与公司均未识别风险
Official source ↗
阀门卡涩/内漏RPN 54 · High
Failure Mechanism
阀门卡涩/内漏 驱动材料退化/功能失效
How to Detect
Online monitoring · Detection rate 80% ;Interval by RBI
Mitigation (What to Do)
  • Periodic inspection
  • 状态监测
  • 性能评估
RCM Strategy
CBMOn-Condition Maintenance
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (6)
  • GB/T 22654
  • GB/T 12250
  • ASME B31.1
  • API 580 — Risk-Based Inspection
  • ISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment
  • API RP 571
Lessons Learned (1)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010Fatalities 11 · Injuries 17 · Safety/Environmental
Macondo / Deepwater Horizon Blowout
Root cause: Blowout-preventer valve sticking + cement plug failure + missing well-integrity verification.
Official source ↗
冲蚀/冲刷腐蚀RPN 54 · High
Failure Mechanism
冲蚀/冲刷腐蚀 驱动材料退化/功能失效
How to Detect
Online monitoring · Detection rate 80% ;Interval by RBI
Mitigation (What to Do)
  • 壁厚测量(UT)
  • 目视/内窥镜检查
  • 腐蚀速率监测
RCM Strategy
CBMOn-Condition Maintenance
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (6)
  • GB/T 22654
  • GB/T 12250
  • ASME B31.1
  • API 580 — Risk-Based Inspection
  • ISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment
  • API RP 571
Lessons Learned (3)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010Fatalities 11 · Injuries 17 · Safety/Environmental
Macondo / Deepwater Horizon Blowout
Root cause: Blowout-preventer valve sticking + cement plug failure + missing well-integrity verification.
Official source ↗
2021-05-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 30 · Safety/Environmental
LyondellBasell La Porte 控制阀误拆甲醇释放(拉波特)
Root cause: 阀门维护中承压部件被误拆,隔离与作业程序不足导致甲醇大量释放;2 死 30 伤
Official source ↗
NUREG-LER-2012-001NUREG2012Operational
Shearon Harris 1 号机 主蒸汽隔离阀活塞环腐蚀致关闭延迟
Root cause: 阀门活塞环意外长期腐蚀;MSIV 未正确纳入气动阀计划;未识别阀门劣化机会
Official source ↗
均匀/局部减薄(通用减薄)RPN 54 · High
Failure Mechanism
均匀/局部减薄(通用减薄) 驱动材料退化/功能失效
How to Detect
Online monitoring · Detection rate 80% ;Interval by RBI
Mitigation (What to Do)
  • 壁厚测量(UT)
  • 目视/内窥镜检查
  • 腐蚀速率监测
RCM Strategy
CBMOn-Condition Maintenance
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (6)
  • GB/T 22654
  • GB/T 12250
  • ASME B31.1
  • API 580 — Risk-Based Inspection
  • ISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment
  • API RP 571
Lessons Learned (3)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010Fatalities 11 · Injuries 17 · Safety/Environmental
Macondo / Deepwater Horizon Blowout
Root cause: Blowout-preventer valve sticking + cement plug failure + missing well-integrity verification.
Official source ↗
2021-05-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 30 · Safety/Environmental
LyondellBasell La Porte 控制阀误拆甲醇释放(拉波特)
Root cause: 阀门维护中承压部件被误拆,隔离与作业程序不足导致甲醇大量释放;2 死 30 伤
Official source ↗
2021-07-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 2 · Toxic/Safety
LyondellBasell La Porte 醋酸装置柱塞阀压力保持件误拆致命泄漏
Root cause: 阀门设计未防人误拆(同类事故重复发生);无拆卸程序与培训;承包商与公司均未识别风险
Official source ↗
大气腐蚀RPN 54 · High
Failure Mechanism
大气腐蚀 驱动材料退化/功能失效
How to Detect
Online monitoring · Detection rate 80% ;Interval by RBI
Mitigation (What to Do)
  • 壁厚测量(UT)
  • 目视/内窥镜检查
  • 腐蚀速率监测
RCM Strategy
CBMOn-Condition Maintenance
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (6)
  • GB/T 22654
  • GB/T 12250
  • ASME B31.1
  • API 580 — Risk-Based Inspection
  • ISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment
  • API RP 571
Lessons Learned (3)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010Fatalities 11 · Injuries 17 · Safety/Environmental
Macondo / Deepwater Horizon Blowout
Root cause: Blowout-preventer valve sticking + cement plug failure + missing well-integrity verification.
Official source ↗
2021-05-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 30 · Safety/Environmental
LyondellBasell La Porte 控制阀误拆甲醇释放(拉波特)
Root cause: 阀门维护中承压部件被误拆,隔离与作业程序不足导致甲醇大量释放;2 死 30 伤
Official source ↗
NUREG-LER-2012-001NUREG2012Operational
Shearon Harris 1 号机 主蒸汽隔离阀活塞环腐蚀致关闭延迟
Root cause: 阀门活塞环意外长期腐蚀;MSIV 未正确纳入气动阀计划;未识别阀门劣化机会
Official source ↗
锅炉水/凝结水腐蚀RPN 54 · High
Failure Mechanism
锅炉水/凝结水腐蚀 驱动材料退化/功能失效
How to Detect
Online monitoring · Detection rate 80% ;Interval by RBI
Mitigation (What to Do)
  • Periodic inspection
  • 状态监测
  • 性能评估
RCM Strategy
CBMOn-Condition Maintenance
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (6)
  • GB/T 22654
  • GB/T 12250
  • ASME B31.1
  • API 580 — Risk-Based Inspection
  • ISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment
  • API RP 571
Lessons Learned (3)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010Fatalities 11 · Injuries 17 · Safety/Environmental
Macondo / Deepwater Horizon Blowout
Root cause: Blowout-preventer valve sticking + cement plug failure + missing well-integrity verification.
Official source ↗
2021-05-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 30 · Safety/Environmental
LyondellBasell La Porte 控制阀误拆甲醇释放(拉波特)
Root cause: 阀门维护中承压部件被误拆,隔离与作业程序不足导致甲醇大量释放;2 死 30 伤
Official source ↗
NUREG-LER-2012-001NUREG2012Operational
Shearon Harris 1 号机 主蒸汽隔离阀活塞环腐蚀致关闭延迟
Root cause: 阀门活塞环意外长期腐蚀;MSIV 未正确纳入气动阀计划;未识别阀门劣化机会
Official source ↗
电偶腐蚀RPN 54 · High
Failure Mechanism
电偶腐蚀 驱动材料退化/功能失效
How to Detect
Online monitoring · Detection rate 80% ;Interval by RBI
Mitigation (What to Do)
  • 壁厚测量(UT)
  • 目视/内窥镜检查
  • 腐蚀速率监测
RCM Strategy
CBMOn-Condition Maintenance
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (6)
  • GB/T 22654
  • GB/T 12250
  • ASME B31.1
  • API 580 — Risk-Based Inspection
  • ISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment
  • API RP 571
Lessons Learned (3)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010Fatalities 11 · Injuries 17 · Safety/Environmental
Macondo / Deepwater Horizon Blowout
Root cause: Blowout-preventer valve sticking + cement plug failure + missing well-integrity verification.
Official source ↗
2021-05-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 30 · Safety/Environmental
LyondellBasell La Porte 控制阀误拆甲醇释放(拉波特)
Root cause: 阀门维护中承压部件被误拆,隔离与作业程序不足导致甲醇大量释放;2 死 30 伤
Official source ↗
NUREG-LER-2012-001NUREG2012Operational
Shearon Harris 1 号机 主蒸汽隔离阀活塞环腐蚀致关闭延迟
Root cause: 阀门活塞环意外长期腐蚀;MSIV 未正确纳入气动阀计划;未识别阀门劣化机会
Official source ↗
结垢/堵塞RPN 45 · Medium
Failure Mechanism
结垢/堵塞 驱动材料退化/功能失效
How to Detect
Online monitoring · Detection rate 60% ;Interval by RBI
Mitigation (What to Do)
  • 监测压差/流量
  • 定期清洗/化学清洗
  • 检查堵塞物
RCM Strategy
CBMOn-Condition Maintenance
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (6)
  • GB/T 22654
  • GB/T 12250
  • ASME B31.1
  • API 580 — Risk-Based Inspection
  • ISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment
  • API RP 571
Lessons Learned (3)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010Fatalities 11 · Injuries 17 · Safety/Environmental
Macondo / Deepwater Horizon Blowout
Root cause: Blowout-preventer valve sticking + cement plug failure + missing well-integrity verification.
Official source ↗
2021-05-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 30 · Safety/Environmental
LyondellBasell La Porte 控制阀误拆甲醇释放(拉波特)
Root cause: 阀门维护中承压部件被误拆,隔离与作业程序不足导致甲醇大量释放;2 死 30 伤
Official source ↗
2021-07-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 2 · Toxic/Safety
LyondellBasell La Porte 醋酸装置柱塞阀压力保持件误拆致命泄漏
Root cause: 阀门设计未防人误拆(同类事故重复发生);无拆卸程序与培训;承包商与公司均未识别风险
Official source ↗