Accident Lesson Card · Real investigation (tap external link for official report)
← Back to KB navigation
HSE Report No. HSE-BPGRANGEMOUTH-FIRE-1987 1987 Fire Fire
BP Grangemouth 火炬线隔离阀 V17 内漏带火拆卸着火(1987,2 死)
BP Oil Grangemouth Refinery, Scotland, UK (HSE Sragtech Case)
Related equipment → Control valve (control_valve)Related equipment → piping (piping)
2Fatalities
0Injuries
FailureMechanism code ELP
Failure Mode · ISO 14224 Mapping
Damage mechanism (recorded in KB)
FailureELP
ISO functional code (as recorded)
ISO 14224:2016 functional failure code
ELP · External leakage - process
ISO ELP — External leakage - process.
1What Happened

火炬线隔离阀 V17 长期内漏(焦粉堵塞),拆卸时阀门微开、法兰间隙滴液→可燃液体池形成蒸气云,被附近空压机引燃闪回,2 名工人死亡

2Root Cause

隔离阀 V17 因焦粉堵塞长期内漏未隔离;拆卸方案细节未落实;无阀位指示;空压机火花引燃

3Reliability Lessons (from investigation root cause)
  • The 'Root Cause' above is the core lesson of this accident; not split further.
4Associated Failure Mechanisms (Keywords)
隔离阀 内漏 火炬 焦粉 拆卸 带火作业 蒸气云 闪回
About the Failure-Mode Code (click to expand)

The recorded code ELP is an ISO 14224:2016 functional failure code (describes what the equipment failed to do). The damage mechanism (how it failed) is shown in the Mapping block above. The two are distinct dimensions in ISO 14224.

5Evidence Source (transparent)
Authority:Health and Safety Executive (HSE), UK — Sragtech Case Study
Official Report:www.hse.gov.uk ↗
Data Verification:verified_url_hse_2026-08-07
Related Failure Modes · Traceability

This accident is not yet linked to a specific FM traceability card.

Report No. HSE-BPGRANGEMOUTH-FIRE-1987 · Data from HSE public investigation conclusions, compiled by Reliability AI, for reliability demonstration purposes only. This case is derived from public incident investigation reports for learning purposes only. AIM does not endorse or guarantee its accuracy.