Pressure Safety Valve (Relief Device)Pressure Safety Valve (Relief Device)
⚠ ⚠ Top risk: 阀座工艺介质泄漏 · RPN 96 (High) — watch this one first at the equipment
Risk Board (all 15 · by RPN · top 6 highlighted urgent)
Shield: Safety = people/environment Production = production only
Technical mechanism/mitigation body in Chinese (red line: no fabricated MT; EN UI labels translated)
15Failure Modes
14High/Critical
13Standards
10Real Accidents
Tap any failure mode to flip to its on-site guidance
Device-level standard/accident index (13 standards / 10 accidents)
Standards (13 de-duplicated)
API 520API 521API 526API 510 — Pressure Vessel Inspection CodeAPI 570 — Piping Inspection CodeAPI 574ASME VIIIGB/T 20801API 581 — Risk-Based Inspection MethodologyISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipmentAPI 580 — Risk-Based InspectionGB/T 7826-2012SAE JA1011_202411 — Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-Centered Maintenance Processes
Accident Lessons (10 de-duplicated)
2021-05-I-TXcsb2021 ↗LyondellBasell La Porte 控制阀误拆甲醇释放(拉波特) 2021-07-I-TXcsb2021 ↗LyondellBasell La Porte 醋酸装置柱塞阀压力保持件误拆致命泄漏 NUREG-LER-2022-001NUREG2022 ↗Susquehanna 1 号机 主蒸汽隔离阀阀座磨损泄漏 2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010 ↗Macondo / Deepwater Horizon Blowout 2014-11-I-TXcsb2014 ↗DuPont La Porte 甲硫醇经两阀泄漏致命中毒 NUREG-LER-2012-001NUREG2012 ↗Shearon Harris 1 号机 主蒸汽隔离阀活塞环腐蚀致关闭延迟 CSB-EXXON-TORRANCE-2017CSB2017 ↗ExxonMobil Torrance 炼厂爆炸 CSB-PEMEX-DEERPARK-2024csb2024 ↗PEMEX Deer Park 胺回收单元硫化氢泄漏 HSE-POLYMERISATION-1992HSE1992 ↗1992 聚合反应失控(反应器+搅拌密封 O 环吹出释放) HSE-FEYZIN-1966HSE1966 ↗Feyzin 炼油厂丙烷球罐排水阀冻裂泄漏爆炸(1966,18 死)
FM Traceability Cards (15)
阀门卡涩(机械卡阻)RPN 72 · Critical
Failure Mechanism
导向面锈蚀/结焦卡阻
How to Detect
Inspection/offline · Detection rate 75% ;Re-inspect ≤every24months
Mitigation (What to Do)
RCM Strategy
CBMOn-Condition Maintenance
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (13)
API 520API 521API 526API 510 — Pressure Vessel Inspection CodeAPI 570 — Piping Inspection CodeAPI 574ASME VIIIGB/T 20801API 581 — Risk-Based Inspection MethodologyISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipmentAPI 580 — Risk-Based InspectionGB/T 7826-2012SAE JA1011_202411 — Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-Centered Maintenance Processes
Lessons Learned (3)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010Fatalities 11 · Injuries 17 · Safety/EnvironmentalMacondo / Deepwater Horizon BlowoutRoot cause: Blowout-preventer valve sticking + cement plug failure + missing well-integrity verification.Official source ↗ 2014-11-I-TXcsb2014Fatalities 4 · Toxic/SafetyDuPont La Porte 甲硫醇经两阀泄漏致命中毒Root cause: 有缺陷的工程设计+缺乏充分防护;管道堵塞排查作业风险识别不足;应急响应混乱Official source ↗ 2021-07-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 2 · Toxic/SafetyLyondellBasell La Porte 醋酸装置柱塞阀压力保持件误拆致命泄漏Root cause: 阀门设计未防人误拆(同类事故重复发生);无拆卸程序与培训;承包商与公司均未识别风险Official source ↗
拒动(超压不开启)RPN 54 · Critical
Failure Mechanism
卡涩/整定漂移/堵塞
How to Detect
Inspection/offline · Detection rate 80% ;Interval by RBI
Mitigation (What to Do)
RCM Strategy
CBMOn-Condition Maintenance
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (13)
API 520API 521API 526API 510 — Pressure Vessel Inspection CodeAPI 570 — Piping Inspection CodeAPI 574ASME VIIIGB/T 20801API 581 — Risk-Based Inspection MethodologyISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipmentAPI 580 — Risk-Based InspectionGB/T 7826-2012SAE JA1011_202411 — Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-Centered Maintenance Processes
Lessons Learned (3)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010Fatalities 11 · Injuries 17 · Safety/EnvironmentalMacondo / Deepwater Horizon BlowoutRoot cause: Blowout-preventer valve sticking + cement plug failure + missing well-integrity verification.Official source ↗ CSB-EXXON-TORRANCE-2017CSB2017Injuries 2 · Explosion/EnvironmentalExxonMobil Torrance 炼厂爆炸Root cause: FCC 单元隔离维修时烃倒流入 ESP 并点燃,安全关键滑阀降级(同 csb_extra 同设施早期事件溯源)Official source ↗ CSB-PEMEX-DEERPARK-2024csb2024Safety/EnvironmentalPEMEX Deer Park 胺回收单元硫化氢泄漏Root cause: 隔离/泄压作业程序缺陷;高风险作业(打开含 H2S 系统)前气体检测与通风不足;PSM 执行薄弱Official source ↗
选型过小排量不足RPN 48 · Critical
Failure Mechanism
工艺变更未重算
How to Detect
Inspection/offline · Detection rate 75% ;Interval by RBI
Mitigation (What to Do)
RCM Strategy
RTFDesign Modification / Inspection Task
Interval: High risk 1-3 mo / Medium 6-12 mo / Low risk at turnaround (by API 581 RBI risk ranking)
Engineering-inferred (not measured history); confirm with equipment owner before execution
Standards (13)
API 520API 521API 526API 510 — Pressure Vessel Inspection CodeAPI 570 — Piping Inspection CodeAPI 574ASME VIIIGB/T 20801API 581 — Risk-Based Inspection MethodologyISO 14224:2016 — Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipmentAPI 580 — Risk-Based InspectionGB/T 7826-2012SAE JA1011_202411 — Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-Centered Maintenance Processes
Lessons Learned (3)
2010-06-I-GOMcsb2010Fatalities 11 · Injuries 17 · Safety/EnvironmentalMacondo / Deepwater Horizon BlowoutRoot cause: Blowout-preventer valve sticking + cement plug failure + missing well-integrity verification.Official source ↗ 2021-05-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 30 · Safety/EnvironmentalLyondellBasell La Porte 控制阀误拆甲醇释放(拉波特)Root cause: 阀门维护中承压部件被误拆,隔离与作业程序不足导致甲醇大量释放;2 死 30 伤Official source ↗ 2021-07-I-TXcsb2021Fatalities 2 · Injuries 2 · Toxic/SafetyLyondellBasell La Porte 醋酸装置柱塞阀压力保持件误拆致命泄漏Root cause: 阀门设计未防人误拆(同类事故重复发生);无拆卸程序与培训;承包商与公司均未识别风险Official source ↗