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HSE Report No. HSE-DSMBEEK-1975 1975 Explosion Explosion Fire Fire
DSM Beek 脱丙烷塔进料罐低温脆裂泄漏爆炸(1975,14 死)
Dutch State Mines (DSM) Naphtha Cracker, Beek, Netherlands (HSE Sragtech Case)
Related equipment → piping (piping)Related equipment type → Pressure Vessel (Pressure Vessel)Related equipment → Distillation column (distillation_column)
14Fatalities
107Injuries
FailureMechanism code FTR
Failure Mode · ISO 14224 Mapping
Damage mechanism (recorded in KB)
FailureFTR
ISO functional code (as recorded)
ISO 14224:2016 functional failure code
FTR · Fail to run / spurious stop
ISO FTR — Fail to run / spurious stop.
1What Happened

脱乙烷塔扰动使进料温度降至约 0℃ 以下,脱丙烷进料罐(正常 65℃)焊缝低温脆裂→40mm 管道(连安全阀)断裂→蒸气云 VCE

2Root Cause

工艺温度大幅偏离设计使焊缝(老化)在低于韧性温度断裂;报警/应急失误,首次报警未触发

3Reliability Lessons (from investigation root cause)
  • The 'Root Cause' above is the core lesson of this accident; not split further.
4Associated Failure Mechanisms (Keywords)
低温脆裂 焊缝 脱丙烷塔 进料罐 管道断裂 蒸气云 VCE 材料韧性
About the Failure-Mode Code (click to expand)

The recorded code FTR is an ISO 14224:2016 functional failure code (describes what the equipment failed to do). The damage mechanism (how it failed) is shown in the Mapping block above. The two are distinct dimensions in ISO 14224.

5Evidence Source (transparent)
Authority:Health and Safety Executive (HSE), UK — Sragtech Case Study
Official Report:www.hse.gov.uk ↗
Data Verification:verified_url_hse_2026-08-07
Related Failure Modes · Traceability

This accident is not yet linked to a specific FM traceability card.

Report No. HSE-DSMBEEK-1975 · Data from HSE public investigation conclusions, compiled by Reliability AI, for reliability demonstration purposes only. This case is derived from public incident investigation reports for learning purposes only. AIM does not endorse or guarantee its accuracy.